Abstract-Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2014 is showing a horrified fact, that when an attacker looked for a site to compromise, one in eight sites made it relatively easy to gain access. Digital forensics is one of our biggest line of defense against cyber criminals, because it provides evidence against them. For attacks against web applications, web application forensics is the branch which gives most of the answers. First, the victim machine usually gives some data, which are then used for identifying possible suspects, and this is followed by forensic analysis of suspects' devices, like computers, laptops, tablets, and even smart phones. In this paper, we use an attack scenario against the known vulnerable web application WackoPicko, using several web attacks: SQL Injection, stored and reflected XSS, remote file inclusion, and command-line injection. We use post-mortem computer forensic analysis of attacker and victim machine to find some artifacts in them, which can help to identify and possible to reconstruct the attack, and most important, to obtain valid evidence which holds in court. We assume that the attacker was careless and did not perform any antiforensic techniques on its machine.
INTRODUCTION
Vulnerability scans of public websites carried out in 2013 by Symantec's Website Vulnerability Assessment Services found that 77 percent of sites contained vulnerabilities, and 16 percent of them were classified as critical vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to access sensitive data, alter the website's content, or compromise visitors' computers (Symantec, 2014) . The OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) Top Ten (2013) each year offers a list of the most critical Web application vulnerabilities for the previous year, and for the 2013, the list includes different types of injection, broken authentication and session management, cross-site scripting, secure misconfiguration, etc. Many organizations lose their reputation or revenue, because of various hackers' attacks. Hacking government institutions' web sites is today means of war and terrorism. The cybercrime is a global problem, and the computer forensics is one way to combat it. Computer forensics prepares legal evidences and give answers to many questions of legal systems related to computers. Analyzed forensic images are the primary evidence. Web Application Forensics is a special branch of the Digital Forensics, which deals with web attacks. It usually starts with an analysis of various log files in the victim machine (Segal, 2002) .
We chose to investigate five types of attacks, SQL injection, stored and reflected XSS, remote file injection, and command-line injection, which are usually conducted through a web browser. We are interested in what kind of post-mortem forensic artifacts can be found after performing each attack separately, on the attacker and victim machine. Also, we assume that the attacker did not perform any anti-forensic techniques (format, wipe, log edits, etc.) on both machines. As a tested web application, we use known vulnerable WackoPicko, first introduced by Doupe et al. (2010) . We are aware that conducted research is very platform specific, so our results holds for the dominant Apache web server and Kali Linux attacker's machine. But similar artifacts can be also expected on other related attacker/victim platforms, too.
We showed that all types of conducted attacks leave many traces on both machines, most of them in log files on the victim and web history in the attacker's machine. Maybe, command-line injection attack leaves the fewest artifacts on the attacker' machine.
After Introduction Section, Section II is devoted to attacking scenario, including a short description of vulnerable web application WackoPicko, and detailed description of the five performed attacks: SQL injection, stored and reflected XSS, remote file inclusion and command-line injection. In Section III we give a brief overview of performing forensic analysis of both machines, followed by discussion of the results and final conclusions.
A. Previous work
To our knowledge, there are no many papers for forensic analysis of specific web attacks. Andrade and Gan (2012) investigate passive attacks for determination of vulnerabilities of Linux Ubuntu server, using Linux BackTrack 5 tools, including Metasploit, Nessus, Whatweb, Nmap, PHP-Backdoor and Weevely. They use netstat tool and server log files for forensic investigation of the attacks. Good forensics analysis of Linux RAM is given in (Urrea, 2006) . Shulman and Waidner (2014) show how digital signatures from DNSSEC can be useful in forensic analysis. Snow et al. (2011) propose a new framework for enabling fast and accurate detection and forensic analysis of code injection attacks.
II. ATTACK SCENARIO
For the attack, we use virtual WMware machine with installed Kali Linux version 1.0.9a (which is Debian derivate) and with IP address 192.168.60.163 .
A. Vulnerable web application WackoPicko
The vulnerable WackoPicko application is a photo sharing and photo-purchasing site, where users can upload photos, browse other user's photos, comment on photos, and purchase the rights to a high-quality version of a photo. It has 10 vulnerabilities accessible without authentication (reflected and stored XSS, reflected XSS behind JavaScript, predictable Session ID for admin, weak admin password, reflected SQLI, command-line injection, file inclusion, unauthorized file exposure, and parameter manipulation), and 6 vulnerabilities accessible after logging into the web site (multi-step stored XSS, stored SQLI, directory traversal, forceful browsing, logic flaw and reflected XSS behind Flash).
The web server hosting WackoPicko and used in our experiments was run on the OWASP Broken Web Applications Project virtual machine [8] , which has numerous intentionally vulnerable applications (we ignore other applications). The following technologies are used: Apache 2.2.14 on Linux Ubuntu 10.04.1, PHP/5.3.2-1ubuntu4.5 with Suhosin-Patch, and MySQL 5.0.67. The IP address of the victim server is 192.168.60.141.
B. Conducted attacks
We conducted five types of attacks on the WackoPicko, including:
 SQL Injection on the login form;
 Stored XSS on the guestbook page;
 Reflected XSS on the search form;
 Remote file inclusion with null byte injection;
 Command-line injection on the password field.
SQL Injection on the login form is done by injecting a known string 1'or 1=1#, which allow us to login without a password as Sample User.
WackoPicko has search.php script with search field in which, the query parameter is vulnerable to reflected XSS attack. We have used one of the standard examples for performing this kind of attack, which returns the PHPSESSID session cookie in the dialog box of the user's web browser: Using this shell, we have removed the folder cart (rm -rf cart) and we have created new folder papka (mkdir papka). Using the shell c99shell.php, we have edited the page http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/test.php, by adding a new link to the page http://www.stip.gov.mk. We chose two different shells, because b374k-2.8.php sends commands to the server as part of the POST request body, and c99shell.php sends commands as parameters in the URL.
Other remote file inclusion attack uses the known hacker tool Metasploit (from Kali Linux) and its Reverse TCP Payload command, for generating the reverse shell payload /root/napad.php on the attacker's machine. The procedure for uploading and using this shell on the victim machine is the same as previous. Using this shell, we have deleted the file error.php (rm error.php) and uploaded the file stip.html (upload /root/stip.html).
There is a passcheck.php script for checking password strength. Its password field is vulnerable to command-line injection. Using this vulnerability, we have deleted the file tos.php (123|rm -f tos.php #).
Usually, attackers use IP spoofing, but in this case we are not doing that, because we want to see the artifacts left on the attacker's machine, by performing some web attacks.
III. PERFORMING FORENSIC ANALYSIS
In forensics expertise there are three main phases: acquisition, analysis, presentation.
In the acquisition phase, the state of digital system, with all allocated and unallocated areas, is saved for later analysis. This copy is called an image. For the preserving integrity of the image, the hash result of the image is calculated and saved. For making the image we used the free AccessData FTK Imager 3.1.
The analysis phase takes the acquired data and involves examination of every piece of data from the evidence. We are starting with hypothesis for what kind of attack can be found. This phase includes search with keywords (names of files or folder that we assume that are produced from the attack). For analysis we are using two forensic tools -Autopsy (The Sleuth Kit, freeware), and WinHex (freeware).
In the last presentation phase, conclusions are made from the analysis and it is necessary to prepare a documentation that can be in a readable format for people who work in courts. This document is called forensic report. Clearly, the final part with forensic report is not done in this research.
A. Analysis of the victim server
The analysis of the victim image is done with the following forensic techniques: In terms of the file system analysis and recovering of deleted data, the investigator seeks for unusual entries in the log files and specially POST data, script abuses and unusual parameters in the URL, files created and/or modified around the suspected time of the attack, many accesses from the same IP address, etc. We have found that several new php scripts are present in the system, and that some files are recently changed. We can use their names in keyword search for both machines. We have examined the log files: error.log, access.log, mysql.log, and their versions with different extensions, for example, log.1, or log.1.gz. Again, we assume that we are dealing with careless attacker that did not change the log files. From the log files analysis, we can first determine that the attack on this server is performed from the IP address 192.168.60.163; and looking at user agent string ("Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140924 Firefox/24.0 Iceweasel/24.8.1"), we can determine that the attacker's machine runs on 64-bit version of Linux operating system, with Mozilla Firefox 24.0 web browser based on Gecko. Additionally, Iceweasel is a Debian rebranded version of Firefox, which means that the Linux operating system is Debian derivate. We have obtained also traces that show the use of b374-2.8.php, c99shell.php and napad.php shells, and even the modification of the file test.php with c99shell (see Table I `salt`) INTO `pictures` (`id`, `title`, `width`, `height`, `tag`, `filename`, `price`, `high_quality`, `created_on`, `user_id`) VALUES (NULL, 'ugd_logo', '128', '128', 'ugd_logo', 'ugd_logo/ugd_logo', '2', 'MzEzMjM5Mw==', NOW(), '12') 572 Query SELECT pictures.filename, pictures.id, pictures.user_id, users.login from pictures, users where pictures.id != '17' and pictures.tag like 'ugd_logo' and pictures.user_id = users. id order by RAND() limit 2 573 Query INSERT INTO `comments_preview` (`id`, `text`, `user_id`, `picture_id`, `created_on`) VALUES (NULL, '<script>location=\"http://www.ugd.edu.mk/index.php/en/\"; </script>', '12', '17', NOW()) INTO `comments` (`id`, `text`, `user_id`, `picture_id`, `created_on`) VALUES (NULL, '<script>location=\"http://www.ugd.edu.mk/index.php/en/\"; </script>', '12', '17', '2014-12-20 11:48:12') The first one, show us how the attacker's SQL injection query is processed, the second one is for uploading of a picture, and the third one tells us the creation date and time for stored XSS attack as a comment under the picture with id 17 from the user with user_id 12. These traces can be connected to the machine 192.168.60.163 using logs from access.log file that show accesses to the WackoPicko's scripts login.php, upload.php, preview_comment.php and add_comment.php in the same times. One example is the following trace for uploading a file 192. 168.60.163 --[20/Dec/2014:11:43:16 -0500] " POST /WackoPicko/pictures/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 303 20 "http://192.168.60.141/WackoPicko/pictures/upload.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140924 Firefox/24.0 Iceweasel/24.8.1" 192.168.60.163 --[20/Dec/2014:11:43:16 -0500] " GET /WackoPicko/pictures/view.php?picid=17 HTTP/1.1" 200 1211 "http://192.168.60.141/WackoPicko/pictures/upload.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0 From the log files found in the location presented before, a keyword list can be prepared. In our research, the keyword list consists of the following terms: 1=1#, b374k, c99shell, %00.php, ugd, papka, napad, stip.html, tos.php, www.stip.gov.mk, and www.ugd.edu.mk, cart, error.php. Part of the useful results of the keyword search with WinHex were the same as those found in log files, and are presented in the Table I . Figure I shows how the results of the keyword search look in WinHex. The keyword www.ugd.edu.mk, beside in the mysql.log, is found also in the comments.myd and comments_preview.myd files with part of database' data. The keywords papka and stip.html are found in the .journal file.
Figure 1 Part of the keyword search results on victim machine as given by WinHex
For command-line injection, we look for successful POST requests of the passcheck.php script in the access.log, like 192. 168.60.163 --[22/Dec/2014:03:03:34 -0500] " POST /WackoPicko/passcheck.php HTTP/1.1" 200 1015 "http://192.168.60.141/WackoPicko/passcheck.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140924 Firefox/24.0 Iceweasel/24.8 
.1"
An enormous interest was expected to be the swap file (which had 400MB of size) and inside that file were not found any hits, which could be further treated as clues/traces for the interest in the analysis. Or in other words, the SWAP area has proven as a useless target for the task.
B. Analysis of the attacker's machine
The analysis of the suspect's image is done with the following forensic techniques using Autopsy:
 File system analysis and hash comparing  Log file analysis and internet history files  OS and third party software artifacts/CLI history overview  Keyword search
 Preparation of forensic report
According to the report of the incident and the previous analysis on the server, the forensic expert can have a starting point for answering the question -Is the suspect the attacker itself? We actually have the attacker's machine, and the following results are found:
File system analysis and hash comparing We can conclude that careless attacker that saves and use shells for an attack, lives evidences for their existence on both machines.
Log file analysis and internet history files
The mentioned activity in general is focused on locating internet artifacts which can be found in web browser temporary storage and browser's history files. In this case, several URL records and cached content is found, which proves that the user was visiting the attacked site. Because in our case, FireFox was used by the attacker, there are several very interesting files. The places.sqlite file keeps track of visited pages and saved bookmarks, the cookies.sqlite file is used for temporary storage of cookie updates, and the formhistory.sqlite file stores values that the user enters into form input fields.
Since our attacking methods are conducted through the interface of the web browser, this analysis can prove the act of the first, third and fourth attack, the methodology (used scripts) and the files that were the object of the intrusion. Sample results are given in Table III and Table IV . Figure 2 shows the forensic artefacts for SQL injection, remote file inclusion and reflected XSS attack, found in the formhistory.sqlite file. 
Figure 2 Forensic artifacts found in the formhistory.sqlite
Because web browser is the primary way of performing selected attacks, it is normal that we have found evidence in Internet history, and in the saved web cookies, again, if the attacker is careless.
OS and third party software artifacts A useful forensic artifacts are found in the bash history file (Table V) , which show the creation of napad.php script. Apparently the forensic expert can conclude that the user has cleaned the other history of the shell activity, or the shell was not used for other attacks. Also, additional interesting forensic artifact can be the IP address of the suspect's machine, but in this case, the operating system of the suspect machine was using an automatic assigned IP address of the virtual machine. Therefore, the file at the location etc/network/interfaces in this case does not prove anything.
If the attacker had used the command prompt for carrying the attack, the bash_history file keeps the records of executed commands (if it is not erased by the attacker). So, for example, if the attacker uses the Metasploit console, every command will be recorded in the bash_history file. From the keyword search approach we can obtain additional information, some of them are presented in Table VI (for keyword hack.html). Some of the search hits are in temporary database files as meta.db-wal, other are in database file as formhistory.sqlite and places.sqlite, other in the free space, in journal files, etc. 
